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Much recent economic literature on the socioeconomic factors affecting
fertility has focused on the "price" of children. A good bit of attention has
been paid to the effect of the price the woman assigns to her time. It is
argued that these time inputs constitute a predominant part of the costs of
production of "child services," in particular while the child is young.1 The
price of time has figured as a main determinant of almost every dimension
of fertility: the amount of child services produced, the trade off between
the quality of children and the number of children, the timing of the first
child, and the spacing of the various children.
The first endeavors were to associate the woman's price of time with the
wage rate of working women who have the same market characteristics.
An objection to this procedure is that the wage rate of working women is
net of her general on-the-job training costs and that a true measure of the
price women have to pay for having children should include the costs of
depreciation of their market skills as well as the value of appreciation of
their nonmarket skills (Michael and Lazear 1971). Furthermore, over
three-fifths of all American married women as yet abstain from entering
into the labor force in any given week, implying in their behavior that they
reject the wage offered to them by the market as an adequate compensation
for the loss of nonmarket productivity (Willis 1969 [rev. 1971] ;Gronau
Ibenefited from suggestions by Gary Becker, Barry Chiswick, StanleyDiller,
Robert Hall, James Heckman, William Landes, Arleen Leibowitz, Gregg Lewis, Robert
Michael, Jacob Mincer, Marc Nerlove, T. W. Schultz, and Robert Willis. I wrote this
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1973). This is particularly true in the case of mothers of young children.
Thus, while 68 percent of all urban white American married women stayed
out of the labor force during the 1960 census week, over 85 percent of all
white mothers with one child and over 90 percent of all white mothers
with two or more children under 3 years old found that their value of
marginal product at home exceeded that of the market.2 Any evaluation of.
the price of children has to start, therefore, with the evaluation of the price
of time of those mothers who devote their whole time to the home, the
housewives.
There is little direct evidence on the price families place on the house-
wife's time. Admittedly, one may find some indirect evidence in studies of
the labor-force participation of married women (e.g., Mincer 1962a; Cain
1966); but most of these studies, though recognizing the importance of
children to the participation decision, did not investigate the effect of
children in sufficient detail to allow any inference on the effect of children
on the housewife's value of time. Some more recent studies (Smith 1972b
and, in particular, Leibowitz 1972) contributed significantly to the dis-
carding of the notion that children can be treated as a homogeneous com-
modity, but these studies still did not provide direct evidence on the price
of the women's inputs in the production of child services. Likewise, an
attempt to measure directly the change, explained by presence of children,
in time inputs involved in housework (Hill and Stafford 1974; Leibowitz
1972)is only circumstantial evidence, serving as a complement rather
than a substitute to a direct evaluation of the housewife's value of time.
I have tried in the past to estimate the price of time of nonworking
women (Gronau 1973, 1974). These estimates were based on aggregate
data, a method that proved expensive both in computation and in terms of
loss of information. Thus, I was able to examine only the effect of income
and young children on the housewife's shadow price of time, leaving
out variables such as the woman's age, education, and number and age
composition of children. The inclusion of these variables in the analysis
called for a method of estimation utilizing disaggregate data. The descrip-
tion of this method and the new estimates of the factors effecting the
shadow price of time occupy most of this paper.
I analyze herein the woman's age and education, her family income, her
husband's age and education, and the number and the age composition of
her children. It is found that education has a considerable effect on the
woman's value of household productivity: the shadow price of time of
college graduates exceeds that of elementary school graduates, other things
being equal, by over 20 percent. Husband's characteristics (age and educa-
tion) have a much smaller effect on the price of a wife's time (e.g., the
2 These data are based on the 1960 Census 1/1,000 sample and refer to urban white
married women belonging to primary families only. These rates would, of course, have
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price of time of women married to college graduates exceeds the prIce of
time of those married to elementary school graduates, other things being
equal, by less than 10 percent). The income elasticity of the price of time
is relatively low (less than 0.15) but seems to increase with income. The
effect of children on the shadow price of time of their mothers seems to
vary with the child's age and the mother's education. The existence of
children tends to increase the value placed on their mother's time, but
this effect diminishes with the child's age. Moreover, given the child's age,
the effect of a child on his mother's value of time is not uniform but varies
with her education. The effect of a young child (less than 3 years old)
increases with the mother's level of education. A child older than 3 years
seems not to have any effect on the price of his mother's time if her formal
schooling ended at the elementary level, and has almost the same effect on
his mother's price of time regardless of whether she finished only high
school or whether she continued her studies in college. A child over 11 years
old maintains his positive effect if his mother is a high school graduate but
may have even a negative absolute effect if his mother is a college graduate.
These last results are highly tentative and call for additional investigation.
Economic theory is of little help in predicting the direction and magni-
tude of the effects of most of the variables discussed above. The evaluation
and interpretation of our results must, therefore, rest to a large extent on
the indirect evidence, on the evidence collected by scientists in some related
fields of social science (e.g., educational psychology), and, at least partly,
on intuitive observations.
I.The Shadow Price of Time
The adage "time is money" has, since Becker's pathbreaking article of
1965, become a part of economic theory. The answer to the question, "How
much money is time?" leads, however, a shaky life within the framework
of economic analysis. More and more economists, in particular those
interested in transportation, have come to question the traditional answer
that the value one places on his time is equal to the person's marginal wage
rate. This contention drew increasing fire from two directions—from those
arguing that this equality ignores any possible differentials between the
direct utilities associated with work and nonwork activities, and from
those attacking the presupposition that time can be shifted freely between
the market and nonmarket sector. Addressing ourselvestothe latter
reservation, if the number of working hours is fixed institutionally, or, in
particular, if the person does not work at all, one is faced with a "dual
economy" in which input prices in the two sectors need not necessarily be
equal.
Formally, let there be two commodities (or activities), say "standard of460 REUBEN GRONAU HOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF
living" (5) and "child services" (C),3eachbeing produced by combining
the household members' time (T%) and market goods (Xe)
S = S(XS, TS,,L, T,,),
(1)
C = C(Xe, Tern, Ta,),
where it is assumed for simplicity that the family consists of two adults,
husband (m) and wife (J), and that children do not contribute to house-
hold production. Given perfect foresight, the family maximizes its inter-
temporal welfare function U:
(2)
where the utility in any given period Z, is a function of the quantities of
Si and C consumed during that period:4
(3)
The maximization of welfare takes place under two kinds of constraints:
(a) the intertemporal wealth constraint,
+Xe,)
=
Twmj + WijTwmj)+ V,(4)
where denotes the time spent in work by person i in period j,W,,is the
wage rate, V is the initial endowment of nonhuman capital, and a
discount factor; and (b) the temporal time constraints
T I = m, /j=1, . ., n.
The maximization of the welfare function subject to these constraints yields
the optimal life-cycle pattern of consumption—for example, the optimal
timing and spacing of children—as well as the optimal combination of in-
puts required in the production of each commodity. One of these interior
equilibrium conditions is the familiar equality of the value of the marginal
productivity of time in all its uses with price-time charges in the market,
namely, the wage rate
There is nothing, however, in the model that will rule out corner solu-
Both S and C are in effect vectors of commodities. In particular, C is a vector
describing the "quality" of the children in the various age groups.
4 In this formulation the utility derived from a child may vary over time both
because of the aging of the parents (a change in the function and because of the
aging of the child (a change in the composition of the vector C,).
5 Note that this method commits the same sinI mentioned earlier. The utility
derived from S and C is independent of the way these commodities are produced, and
does not figure in the welfare function altogether. Thus, I rule out any psychic
income (positive or negative) associated with work or child care.
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tions, and in particular the corner solution = 0, that is, the wife does
not work in the market in period j.Itcan be easily shown that in this case
the woman's price of time (W1) becomes an endogenous variable being
determined by the familiar equation stating that the input price should
equal its value of marginal product:
1% A A WIj = = xCJCT/J, (6)
where STIJ and CTJ, denote the marginal product of the wife's time in the
production of S and C in period 3,respectively,and the commodity price
is itself an endogenous variable:
A
= + W,ntjm+W1t ifj = S, C, (7)
X1, tim, andbeingthe marginal inputs of goods, husband's time, and the
wife's time in the production of commodity i, and the subscript 3being
omitted for clarity.6 The price of time changes over the life cycle. For
some periods, when the woman works, it equals the marginal wage rate,
and for other periods, when the woman stays out of the labor force, it
exceeds the wage rate.
The supply of women's time is infinitely inelastic (fig. 1). The shadow
price of her time, in the absence of market opportunities, is therefore
demand determined. The demand for her time consists of the derived
6 DifferentiatingUwithrespectto subject to the time and budget constraints
yields
U8) STj.f = U,,= (6')
where U,,isthe marginal utility of commodityi and denotesthemarginal utility
ofT1inperiod j.Equilibriuminthe commodity"market"implies
U11 = (6")
beingthe marginal utilityof wealth. Combining (6')and(6") yields (6) where
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demand for T2, in each of its uses, which in turn depends on the com-
modity prices andi,),theprice of other inputs (Wm), and the tech-
nology employed. A change in any one of these parameters will shift the
derived demand curve DT! and change the shadow price of time.
Assuming that the production functions (eq. [1]) are linear homoge-
neous, it has been shown that an increase in the initial endowment of non-
human capital V increases the demand for both commodities (ruling out
inferior commodities and inferior outputs) and raises the demand for all
inputs and the shadow price W, (Willis 1969 [rev. 1971]; Gronau 1973).
An increase in the husband's wage rate W,,, gives rise to a substitution
of market goods and the wife's time for the husband's time. An increase
in the demand for the wife's time is enhanced by an income effect and,
possibly, by a substitution between commodities. The wage increase raises
both full income and real full income and, thus, increases the demand for
all commodities and inputs. The same change raises the relative price of
the activity that is husband's-time-intensive and leads to a substitution
of the less husband's-time-intensive commodity for the more time-intensive
commodity. This substitution increases the demand for the wife's time to
the extent that husband's time intensity and wife's time intensity are
negatively correlated.
The most ambiguous of all changes is the change in productivity. This
change may take many forms. It may be commodity biased, input biased,
both commodity and input biased, or neutral in all respects. Moreover,
even if the nature of the technological change is known, one can rarely
predict its effect on the value of the wife's time without making additional
assumptions about factor intensities and the income and substitution
elasticities. The analysis of these factors becomes quite elaborate. Sufli-
cient, therefore, to say that, in general, the tendency of an increase in
the wife's productivity to be accompanied by an increase in the demand
for her time is greater when there is a positive correlation between the
commodities' time intensities and their income elasticities, and when there
is a negative correlation between the husband's time intensities and the
wife's time intensities.
Formal education is considered the prime source of changes in produc-
tivity in the market sector and may very well play a similar role in the
nonmarket sector (though it would be difficult to isolate the contribution
of education to home productivity from that of "natural ability"). "Home
experience" is the variable one would like to use to capture the effect of
on-the-job training on the wife's value of time. In the absence of this
information one may have to revert to a measure of "years married," or
simply "age." Given the ambiguity surrounding the productivity effect,
it would be difficult, however, to predict the effect of age and education
on the wife's value of time.
Age and education assume an additional dimension if one considers the
HOUSEWIFE'SVALUE OF
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if one considers the
intertemporal aspects of our model. The present value of the commodity
prices changes over time because of(1) changes in input prices •and
technology and (2) the existence of a positive interest rate. The change
in commodity and input prices gives rise to a substitution both in pro-
duction and in consumption, resulting in changes in the demand for inputs
over time (Ghez and Becker 1972).Ifthe husband's wage rateis
held constant, the demand for the wife's time and her shadow price of
time will change with her age both because of the effect age may have on
productivity and because of the family's incentive to delay its consump-
tion activity when the rate of interest exceeds the rate of time preference.
Moreover, in this context husband's education not only plays the role of a
proxy for nonmarket productivity but also assumes some of the explana-
tory power of the missing "permanent income" variable.
Finally, it is often claimed that women's behavior is dictated by their
environment. To the extent that the wife's environment is associated with
her husband's age and education, one would like to control these factors
so as to isolate, at least partially, this taste effect.
A natural question at this point is, What role do children play in deter-
mining their mother's price of time? In a world where all families have
the same welfare function, where the production functions are sole func-
tions of age and education, and where the measurement of all variables is
not marred by errors, the answer to this question, which is crux of
this paper, is that children have no independent effect on W1. In this
model, the shadow price of time and the amount of child services are
mutually determined. Given the age and education of the parents, the
husband's wage rate and the family's nonhuman wealth, the family's rate
of interest, and its rate of time preference, all families are supposed to
consume the same amount of "child services," have the same number and
quality of children, and the same price of time W,.
In a less deterministic world where one allows for differences in the
utility function and the production functions among families with seem-
ingly identical characteristics, differences in the number of children may
reflect differences in underlying factors that may also have some bearing
on the wife's value of time. Other things being equal, the difference in the
number of children may be associated with a difference in tastes for "child
services" and a difference in the efficiency of production of this commodity,
either because of more efficient methods of controlling quantity (informa-
tion about methods of contraception) or because of more efficient methods
of producing quality. An increase in the consumption of child services due
to tastes or productivity is associated with a higher value of the mother's
shadow price of time if the production of child services is more intensive
in wife's time than the other commodity. An increased consumption (or
production) of child services does not necessarily imply a larger number
of children. On the other hand, given the parents' characteristics and464 REUBENGRONAU
familyincome, a larger number of children would imply, in general, a
greater consumption of child services. A positive correlation between child
services and the price of time implies, therefore, a positive correlation
between the number of children and price of time. Since the size of the
correlation depends on the time intensity of the production ofchild
services, we should expect the correlation between number of children
and W1 to weaken the less time-intensive child services become. Thus, if
the time intensity changes with the child's age, so should his mother's
price of time.
II.The Estimation of the Price of Time
Figure 1 suggests that in estimating the housewife's price of time one has
to trace her derived demand for time DTI. Alternatively, if one is ready
to contend that there is no inherent difference between housewives and
their counterparts who work in the market as long as they share the same
socioeconomic characteristics, one should be able to impute the housewife's
value of time from data on women's supply of hours to the market. A
woman's labor supply is the mirror image of her derived demand for time
at home, and hence her price of time in the absence of market opportuni-
ties W corresponds to her "entry wage"—the wage at which she is ready
to supply the first unit of labor (see fig. 2). Thus, by estimating women's
labor supply, one should be able to derive the "entry wage" and the house-
wife's value of time. To estimate the effect of, say, income or children on
the housewife's value of time, one has to measure the effect of shifts in
the labor supply function due to these factors on the "entry wage."
This method, so alluring in its simplicity, runs into some overwhelming
difficulties. Economic theory does not specify which of the following is the
"true" dimension of labor supply: weekly hours, weeks worked, annual
hours, and so on. Furthermore, theory supplies very few clues as to the
mathematical function providing the best description of labor supply.7
The estimates turn Out to be very sensitive both as to the nature of the
dependent variable and to the choice of functional form.8 Finally, one has
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regression of the amount of labor on the wage rate is supposed to be negative. This
prior assumption rules out a certain class of mathematical functions (e.g., the double-
log used in the estimation of some aggregate supply functions) but still leaves a wide
scope for choice.
8 Fitting a linear reciprocal function and a semilog function to data on weekly hours,
weeks worked, and annual hours of working women resulted in extremely low values
of the price of time (about 10 percent of the wage rate) and a large dispersion in the
estimates. (The data were derived from the 1960 Census 1/1,000 sample.) The use of a
linear function resulted in significant positive estimates of the intercept even when the
data were restricted to women who worked only part time (say less than 35 hours a
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tween working and nonworking women with the same characteristics. The
mere fact that they differ in their labor-force behavior indicates that there
are some unobserved fundamental differences between the two groups, and
there are good reasons to suspect that these differences may be related to
the price the women assign to their time (Ben-Porath 1973; Gronau
1974). Because of these difficulties it seems advisable to reject this simple
method in favor of a method which focuses on a different dimension of
labor supply—labor-force participation.
Let it be assumed that the family is fully aware of the wife's potential
wage in the market, W*; that this wage is insensitive to the number of
hours worked; and that the search for the employer who will offer this
wage is costless in terms of both time and pecuniary costs.° A necessary
and sufficient condition for search (the necessary and sufficient condition
for the wife's entry into the labor force) is that her potential wage (W*)
exceeds her value of time in the nonmarket sector (W) •10
Let family income when the woman abstains from entering the labor
force be 0Y0 (fig. 3); then the housewife's value of time can be measured
by the slope of her indifference curve UU at the point C. Assuming other
9The analysis will not change significantly if I adopt a somewhat more sophisticated
search model (McCall 1970; Mortensen 1970) where the job-offer distribution consists
of more than one point and the optimal strategy consists of a determination of a
critical value W*, so that the job seeker accepts a job if the wage offer exceeds W*
and continues his search otherwise.
10 For a more general discussion of the labor-force participation decision, see Lewis
(1971).466 REUBEN GRONAU HOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF
sources of income (including husband's earnings) do not change as a
result of her decisions, the woman will decide to look for a job actively if
her potential wage exceeds CW*0 and will decline to enter the labor market
otherwise. Comparing the reactions of women who are supposed to have
the same price of time but who have different potential wages should give
some indication as to the potential wage at which these women are indif-
ferent to whether they enter the market, thus yielding an estimate of
their price of time.
This method may yield a biased estimator if some of our basic assump-
tions are violated. For example, if work involves a fixed cost (such as
search costs) consisting of T0T, units of time and units of income
the woman does not enter the labor force unless her potential wage exceeds
BW*1. This wage overstates the woman's value of time. This overesti-
mate may be inflated by deviations of the measured wage rate from the
"true" wage. Discrepancies of this kind may originate in taxes, variable
costs associated with work, and psychic income. For example, given a
proportional tax rate, the net wage affecting the woman's participation
decision may be BW*1 but the measured wage before taxes is BW*8.
Similarly, if work involves time and pecuniary costs (such as commuta-
tion)that vary proportionally with the amount of work, orif work
involves a proportional negative psychic income component, the measured
wage exceeds the true wage (psychic income has an opposite effect when
it is positive). Further distortions in the measurement of the "true" wage
rate occur when the average wage deviates from the marginal wage because
of an increasing marginal wage rate, progressive taxation, changes in the
psychic income, and costs per unit of work, or changes in the husband's
supply of work, resulting in a nonlinear price line. Finally, there may
exist a minimum amount of work demanded by the employers (say, T0T2).
This minimum requirement may increase the wage rate at which women
enter the labor market (BW*2) and the upward bias in the estimated price
of time. Bearing these reservations in mind we continue the analysis.
It is clear that even women who seem to have the same market charac-
teristics (say education and age) may differ randomly in their potential
wage. Similarly, women who seem to have the same nonmarket character-
istics may differ in the price they place on their time. Let it be assumed,
for the sake of exposition, that the potential wage is known, and that
the women's price of time is
A
TZ7 A A
VV1k = +Elk, (8)
where isthe mean value of time of all women sharing the set of non-
market characteristics k, and,,.is the ith random from this
mean. The woman participates in the labor market if Wk, that is, if
—J.tk Elk,
and she remains a full-time homemaker otherwise.
(9)
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Variableis an unobserved variable. However, one can conjecture
about the variables that affect it. In the preceding section, the mean price
of time of a woman was associated with her age (A,), education (E,),
family income (F), number of children (C), and husband's age (Am)
and education (Em). Let it be assumed that these variables affectin
an additive fashion:11
E,,,.(10)
Furthermore, let us define whereis the standard deviation of W.
The woman participates in the labor force if
{W* ++++++





the probability that a given woman participates in the labor force equals
1)
+ (13)
where a value X = 1is assigned to every woman participating in the labor
forceand a value of X., = 0 is assigned to full-time housewives. The
logarithm of the likelihood of observing a sample of n independent obser-
vations consisting of r women participating in the labor force and (n —r)
nonparticipants equals
i=r+1
Given the n values of F,,,V.,, C1, A.,,, and the likelihood
function depends on the parameters ..,andUsingthe probit
iterative method (Tobin 1955), one can obtain the maximum-likelihood
estimators,
= b0 + beAfl + + b3V1 + b4C,
+ b5Ami + b5A,,,, + b6E,,,, + (14)
b7 serving as an estimator of the coefficient of W* in the likelihood func-
tion, that is, of 1/s, and b,(l0, 1,...,6)serving as an estimator of
11 There is nothing in the analysis of the preceding section to indicate that this
relationship islinear, and I will not try to justify it by imposing on the model a
specific set of utility and production functions. The assumption of linearity is adopted
merely for simplicity's sake.468 REUBEN GRONAU HOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF TI
Aconsistent estimator of &istherefore 1/b7,anda consistent
estimator of 13tis—b,/b7.
The analysisisnot much affected when is unknown, but one knows
the mean potential wage where
wi,,=+ (15)
denotingthe random deviation of the potential wage of woman i with
market characteristics jfromits mean. In this case the prerequisite for
entry into the labor force is
A A = —fLk —5*, (16)
Ifhasa normal distribution (cN[O, a]), one can still apply the
probit analysis to obtain consistent estimators of 13,13i,..., anda by
replacing in equation (14) by Note,however, that in this case
one cannot estimate separately the standard deviation of the price of time
&,butristher a which reflects dispersions both of the price-of-time distribu-
tion and of the wage-offer distribution.
Unfortunately, one knows neither W" nor its mean Aninherent
difficulty in the estimation of labor-supply functions is the nonexistence
of data on the wage offers received (or expected) by those women who do
not work. The same problem plagues our study. This problem has received
very little attention in the economic literature.'3 In the past economists
opted for one of two routes of escape. One way is to postulate the relation-
ship between the mean wage offer and some measurable market character-
istics, say the woman's age and education,
= a0 ++a2E1, (17)
and the introduction of these variables in equation (14). Alternatively,
it was assumed that the mean wage offer equals the average wage of
working women with the same market characteristics (W). Either one of
these methods is sizzling with problems which mar the reliability of the
estimates of the determinants of the price of time.
If one opts for the first method, the wife belongs to the labor force if
[(cco—*o)+(a,—131)A,
assumption of normality is a common one in economics and does not cail
for much justification. It does not necessarily call for an assumption that W* and W
have an independent bivariate normal distribution. However, if one opts for that
line of explanation, one can argue that the assumption of is justified on
the ground that any positive correlation between W* and W due to natural ability
may be offset by the negative effect ol specialization in the investment in human
capital. It would be more difficult to justify in this case the assumption of homo-
scedasticity,sinceheteroscedasticityinthewage-offerdistributionshould imply
heteroscedasticity of e.
'3 The only exception is Lewis (1971).
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ore 1/b7 and aconsistent where e' = c/a (i.e., c'N [0, 1]). One can still apply the probit method
to estimate
is unknown, but one knows = a,, + a,A1 + a,E1 + a5Y + a4C + a,Am + a6E,,,
to obtain the maximum-likelihood estimators a, = est [l/o(at —3,)]for
1 = 0, 1, 2, and a, = est (—13,/a) for 1 = 3, 4, 5, 6. However, one cannot
estimate the absolute effects onof income, children, and husband's char-
acteristics but only their relative effects (13,/a), since 13,(1 = 3, 4,5,6)
can be estimated only up to a factor of proportionality 1/a. Moreover,
one cannot separate in this case the effect of the woman's characteristics
(age and education) on the mean price of time from their effect on the
mean wage offer.'4
Given the adverse circumstances, one may be ready to forego an esti-
mate of the effect of the wife's age and education on her price of time as
long as one can obtain an estimate of the (relative) effect of the other
factors (income, children, and husband's characteristics). But even these
estimates are not free of criticism. Objection may be raised to the specifica-
tion of the wage function. A case can be made for including in the wage
function all the variables that affect the price of time. Husband's income
may affect the wife's potential wage in various ways. Progressive taxation
makes the wife's wage rate after taxes a function of her husband's income.
Income also affects the probability of the wife's past and future participa-
tion in the market, and thus affects the profitability of the investment in
market skills versus nonmarket skills. The same holds for children. The
number of children affects the marginal tax rate and hence the net wage
rate. It may also be negatively correlated with the mother's market ex-
perience and, hence, her potential wage rate (Michael and Lazear 1971).
Given age and education, variations in the husband's income may reflect
variations in his natural ability. Husband's and wife's natural ability seem
to be positively correlated (Becker 197 la), and thus one would expect that,
other things being equal, the husband's age and education may affect his
wife's asking wage.
If one expands equation (17) to include also the rest of the variables
appearing in equation (10), one cannot estimate even the relative effect
of income, children, and husband's characteristics on the woman's price
of time. The estimates of these factors based on equation (19) should,
therefore, be regarded as merely a first approximation, assuming that the
effects of income, children, and husband's age and education on the wife's
expected wage offer are negligible.
Some of these difficulties are removed if one opts for the alternative
14 Note that the inclusion of a term in the wage-offer function (17) that does not
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method, assuming= butthis hypothetical "gain" maybe offset by
acquiring new difficulties. Admittedly, the equation= involves a
very strong assumption. Different patterns of participation behavior of
women with seemingly identical market and nonmarket characteristics may
be the result of different potential wages and not necessarily of different
values of time (Ben-Porath 1973; Gronau 1974). A low rate of partici-
pation in group jk may be due not to a high price of time but rather to a
low mean wage rate. Under these circumstances the average wage of work-
ing women clearly overestimates the mean wage offer of nonparticipants.
The danger of this kind of bias is accentuated by our measure of market
experience. Market experience is presented in the wage function (eq. [171)
by a proxy age. This far from ideal choice is forced upon us by the lack of
a better measure. The possibility of a bias in the measurement of the mean
wage offer increases the greater the variation in wages of women with a
given market experience and the greater the variation in market experience
of women of the same age. Thus, this bias may be relatively small for young
women who are quite homogeneous in terms of their market experience
but may be considerable for women beyond the age of 50.15 This bias will
enforce the upward tendency in the bias discussed above. Moreover, errors
in the measurement ofmay result in inconsistent estimates of the other
coefficients (13k,...,and bias the estimated effects of the explanatory
variables on the price of time. Thus, it is only with great forbearance that
one would adopt the simplistic assumption= W.
However, if one is ready to overcome these misgivings, one can estimate
equation (14) replacing W* by W. The mean value of time at the point of
means can be estimated by
b1A,+b2E,+ b3V+b4C+ bsAm+beErn);(20)
measuresthe absolute effect of factor 1onji, and —b,/b7 ji
measures its relative effect.
Fortunately, if one assumes thatand W*areindependently normally
distributed, one can use the information on the labor-force participation
rate and the average wage of working women to obtain an estimate of
Equations (14) and (20) provide in this case a consistent estimate of
i,. ..,and of the mean price of time.
15 It was found that teen-agers who have been asked what wage they expect to
receive when they start working quoted a wage that was almost equal tothe
average wage of working people of the same age. — —
It can be shown (Gronau 1973, 1974) that if=+
= (a*/a)
1 = (16')
where a* is the standard deviation of W*,=+ is the labor-force partici-
-i
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Finally, one can replace the assumption thatisan additive function of
A1, E,, ...,K,,,by the assumption that this function is multiplicative
A1E,VCA,,,Em
B, B,B8 (21)
where= log Moreover, let it be assumed thathas a log-normal
distribution [eA (0, tI) }.Equation(14) can be estimated by substitut-
ing log WforW*, where Wdenotesthe geometric rather than the arith-
metic average wage rate.'8 Let M denote the mean of the logarithm of W
anddenote the standard deviation of the logarithm of r; then (1/b,) =
and M can be estimated from equation (20). Variable eM is the
median of the log-normal distribution of W. To obtain an estimate of the
mean one has to know the dispersion of log(Aitchison and Brown 1963,
p. 9). This calls for the additional assumption that= 0, that is, that
there is no within-group dispersion of the potential wage, the standard
deviation ofis equal to zero, andmeasures the standard deviation of
log W. Thus, the estimate of the mean price of time is
=




In this case —(b1/b,)measures the percentage change inasa result of
a unit increase in factor 1.
III.The Data and the Results
To estimate the price of time of housewives we return to the 1960 Census
1/1,000 sample. The sample consists of 975 observations selected randomly
from all urban white married women, spouse present, who belonged to
primary families (not to subfamilies) in households with no nonrelatives.
The dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable (zero, one) accord-
pation rate in group j, andsatisfies Prob (Z <Z1) = P, where Z is a standardized
normal variable. Given F, one can compute and regress over different income
groups
=+b'1x*,
where b'0 is an estimate of and b',is an estimate of (a*2/a).
17 An alternative assumption is
A B1B2B3B4 B5B5
E,V C Am Em
(16")
'8Alternatively, one has to replace W by log W in eq. (16") to obtain an estimate472 REUBEN GRONAU
ing to whether the wife participated in the labor force (was employed or
looked actively for a job) in the week preceding the 1960 census. By choos-
ing this dependent variable I focus on the participation decision in the
short run. To obtain some estimates of the price of time in the long run,
one should use a variable that reflects the woman's participation experience
over a longer period of time. Thus, a second dependent variable is defined
describing the wife's work status in the previous year. This variable
assumed a value of one if the woman worked at least 1 week and a value of
zero otherwise.
The income variable is a continuous variable measuring family income
(wife's earnings excluded) in the year 1959. It is argued that husband's
earnings and other sources of income should affect the woman's price of
time differently. Given the unreliability of the data on "other income" and
the husband's wage rate, I did not try to ascertain these differences. The
wife's age and education are defined as dummy variables so as to allow
nonlinear effects of years of age and schooling on the wife's value of time.
The wife's age is described by a set of three dummy variables according to
whether she belonged to the age group "less than 30," "30—49," or "50
plus."1° Similarly, education is defined in terms of whether one belonged to
one of three groups: "elementary education," "high school," or "college"
(the latter included people with graduate education). An identical defini-
tion is used in the case of the husband's education, while the husband's age
was measured, for simplicity, as a continuous variable.
Children are not a homogeneous commodity. Their effect on their
mother's price of time depends on both their number and their age
composition. Thus, children were subclassified into four groups: number
under age 3, number aged 3—5, number 6—11 years old, and number in the
age group 11—1 720 In some of the regressions I included a variable
"children" describing the total number of children less than 18 years old,
omitting the variable "number of children 6—li." In this case the coeffi-
cient of the variable "children" describes the effect of an addition of one
child 6—li years old, while all other coefficients measure the differential
effect of an additional child in group 1ascompared with an additional child
in the age group 6-11 (the net effect of an addition of one child of age 1
anda subtraction of one child of age 6—il).
Allowing for returns to scale in child care, I adopted a second measure
of the effect of children. Using a set of 16 dummy variables, all women
were classified according to whether they had zero, one, two, or three or
more children under age 6, and whether they had zero, one, two, or three or
more children belonging to the age group 6-11. In a second subclassifica-
19 The iterative probit method is too expensive to allow for a greater detail in the
subclassification.
20 Note that the measure is the number of children in a given age group and not
a dummy variable describing the existence of children in that age group.
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tion into a set of 12 dummy variables, women were classified according to
whether they had a child less than 3 years old, had a child age 3—5, and
had zero, one, or two or more children belonging to the age group 6—11.
The 1960 Census does not allow for a direct estimate of the hourly
wage rate. However, it provides data on the woman's annual earnings in
1959, the number of weeks she worked that year, and the number of hours
she worked during the week that preceded the Census. In the absence of a
better measure, the hourly wage rate of a working woman is defined as her
earnings in 1959 divided by the product of weeks worked (in 1959) and
weekly hours (in 1960). All white working women in the 1960 Census
1/1,000 sample were subclassified into four age groups (less than 30,
49, 40—49, and SO plus) and four education groups (elementary, high
school, college, and graduate education) •21 For each of the 16 classes, I
computed the arithmetic and the geometric average of the hourly wage
rate (see table 1), and these values were assigned to all (working and
nonworking) women belonging to that class. Alternatively, I assigned to
each of the 16 classes the estimated mean wage offer
To allow for comparison with past studies of labor-force participation, I
estimated the determinants of the housewives' price of time using all three
methods described in the previous section: (a) assumingis a function
of the woman's age and education, (b) assuming= W, and(c) estimat-
ingfrom data on wage rates and labor-force participation rates. Since
the assumption thatis normally distributed led to results very similar to
those obtained under the assumption that c has a log-normal distribution,
and since the latter assumption seemed to have a greater explanatory
power, I have omitted the former results.23
The estimates of equations (14) and (19) for the weekly rate of partici-
pation are presented in table 2.24 Equation (19) yields familiar results. As
expected, education has a positive effect on labor-force participation: its
effect on market productivity and the asking wage exceed its effect on non-
market productivity and the housewife's price of time. Age has its custom-
21ignored the effect children may have on the women's wage since, contrary to
one'sexpectations(Michael and Lazear1971),working women withchildren
usually have a higher (and not a lower) arithmetic average wage rate than childless
women. The explanation may be that they have a higher price of time and hence may
be more selective in the wage offers they accept. The greater selectivity of these
mothers may offset their lower wage-offer distribution. An attempt to include the
number of young children as a determinant of the asking wage yielded estimates that
were inferior to the one I have described.
22 See n. 16. Additional information about the means of the variables in the sample
is in the Appendix.
Thelog-normal assumption may also be more appealing on theoretical grounds,
since it rules out negative estimates of
24To evaluate the reliability of the estimates, table 2 includes the likelihood-ratio
statistic to test for the hypothesis =0for all1 =1,2 and theIscores
derived as the ratio of the coefficient and its standard error. The former has a x2
distribution while, given the size of the sample, the latter have a normal distribution.474 REUBEN GRONAU
TABLE 1


































































































SouacE.—1960 Census 1/1,000 sample.
ary inverted U-shape effect.25 Income andthehusband's age and education
have the expected positive effect on the mean price of time (i.e., negative
effect of labor-force participation), though the effect of husband's education
seems to be insignificant. An increase in the number of children has a
significant effect on the mother's value of time, but this effect diminishes
the older the child (the differential effect of children in any two adjoining
age groups is usually significant, using a one-tailed test and a level of
significance of a = 0.05).
These conclusions are reaffirmed when Wandthe estimatedare intro-
duced into the regression equation. An increase of $1,000 in husband's
income increases the value of time of his wife (if she does not work) by
1.0—1.8 percent.26 The elasticity of the mean price of time with respect to
income estimated at the point of means equals 0.07—0.12.
25 Note, however, that the broad classification ofage groups may conceal a large
part of the variation taking place within these groups (Leibowitz 1972).
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)476 REUBEN GRONAU I
Whenit is assumed that j.t" = W, the housewife's value of time seems to
increase with her age. There seems to be only a slight increase during the
years up to the age of 50 and a sharp increase thereafter. This pattern is
consistent with the life-cycle theory of consumption (when the interest rate
exceeds the rate of time preference) and with the hypothesis that non-
market human capital depreciates at a slower rate than market human
capital, but it may also reflect a cohort effect (the older cohorts having a
greater demand for home commodities relative to market commodities).
However, replacing W by the estimate ofindicatesthat these findings
are merely due to an overstatement of the potential wage (the wage of
working women over age 50 considerably exceeds the potential wage of
nonparticipants in this age group), age having no significant effect at all
on the housewife's value of time.
Education is a major determinant of the housewife's value of time, but
its effect is not distributed equally among all levels of education. In the
absence of market opportunities, high school graduates would not have
differed significantly from elementary school graduates in terms of their
price of time. It seems that if high school graduates are more productive,
then the increase in productivity is offset by lower commodity prices,
leaving the demand for their time unchanged. There exists, however, a
significant difference (over 20 percent) between the price of time of college
and high school graduates.
The education effect measures the shift in the demand function when in-
come and husband's age and education are held constant. By holding
income constant one controls the amount of goods used by the family.
When "other income" is proportional to total income, and the husband's
age and education determine his wage rate, then by holding income and
husband's age and education constant one controls, at least partly, the
amount of time the husband spends in the market and, consequently, the
amount of time he spends at home. The shifts in the demand for the wife's
time are measured where the total amount of other inputs is maintained
constant, and reflect, therefore, the change in the "economy" productivity
—the change in productivity where output prices are allowed to vary but
the total amount of inputs is given. The increase in the price of time due
to college education can be regarded as a lower limit of the contribution
of college education to home productivity. This contribution constitutes a
substantial part of the benefits of higher education and should be incorpo-
rated in the computation of the rate of return to women's education.
A husband's age has a positive effect on his wife's value of time for
somewhat similar reasons to those brought to explain the correlation be-
tween the wife's age and her price of time (i.e., the life-cycle patterns of
upper limit is obtained when W is replaced by the estimate ofIncome entered into
the regression in its original form. An attempt to introduce this variable in a logarithm
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consumption, a productivity effect,anda cohort effect). The husband's
education has the positive effect one has come to expect if education is a
proxy for permanent income. It is noteworthy that in this case the college/
high school differential is small and insignificant, while there is a significant
difference in the price of time of women married to high school graduates
versus those married to elementary school graduates. This difference may
be explained by the smoothening of the life-cycle pattern of income asso-
ciated with an increased level of education, and the decline in the im-
portance of the transitory component in income, resulting in a decline in
the explanatory power of education when current income is held constant.
Alternatively, the difference can be explained by a larger differential in
market and nonmarket productivity in the case of college-educated hus-
bands due to specialization in the investment in human capital, reflecting
a greater tendency of husbands of little education to participate in home
production (Leibowitz 1972).
The positive effect of the number of children and the decline in the
demand for the mother's time as the child grows older are again apparent.
While one additional child younger than 3 years increases the value of his
mother's time by 14—26 percent, an additional child 3—5 years old results
in a gross increase of only 7—14 percent; a child of 6—11 years results in
an increase of 4—7 percent, and if the child is older than 11 he does not
affect his mother's price of time at all (any increase in the demand for her
time is offset by the child's contribution to home production)
Thedecline in the demand for the mother's time with the age of the child
may be explained by several factors which are difficult to separate. (a) The
technology of production of child services may be such that the marginal
product of C of a given input unit (time and goods) increases with the
child's age. Since it may be difficult to change the output per child of child
services (the child's "quality") as he grows older, this technology should
lead to a decline in inputs with the child's age. (b) An increase in the
elasticity of substitution between the mother's time and market goods and
services as the child grows, and a greater incentive to substitute goods for
time if mother's age has a positive effect on her price of time, may lead to
replacing the mother's time by market goods.(c)Anincrease in the
mother's productivity in the production of child services due to on-the-job
training and formal schooling (formal schooling, for instance, may con-
tribute to a greater increase in productivity the older the child) may allow
her to produce the same level of services with ever-decreasing time inputs.
(d) The utility derived from a child may be directly related to the amount
of time spent in the production of child services. If the psychic income
associated with the production of child services declines as the child grows
older, so would his mother's value of time.
27Allthe age differentials (except for the difference between a child of 3—5years
and one 6—li years old) are significant at ix= .05applied in a one-tailed test.
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Finally, the estimated mean price of time exceeds the mean potential
wage, when it is assumed that pt" =W,by 13 percent. This margin in-
creases to 22 percent when W is replaced by an estimate of However,
since the estimatedis only two-thirds of the (geometric) average wage
rate (W), the estimated value ofadoptingthe latter method, falls short
of the average wage rate by more than 20 percent.
The effect of education on the woman's productivity may depend on
the number and age composition of her children. To investigate the inter-
actionbetween children and education, I distinguish within each age group
of children between children whose mothers have (1) elementary educa-
tion, (2) high school education, and (3) college education. The regression
results are presented in table 3.
The new specification affects neither the price-of-time/wage ratio nor
the estimated effects of income, age, education, and the husband's age and
education (except for a slight change in the estimated effect of elementary
education on the wife's value of time).
Strictly speaking, the only statistically significant result concerning the
children variable is the decline in the effect a child has on his mother's
value of time as he grows older. There is a significant difference between the
effectof a child less than 3 years old and the effect of a child older than 11 0
yearswithin each education group. Neither the difference in the effects of
children in adjoining age groups within a given education group nor the
difference between the effects of children in the same age group with
mothers in adjoining education groups is statistically significant (at a =
.05).Still, the differences in the implict patterns of behavior of the three
education groups are such that they deserve some further discussion, even
if this discussion is speculative.
The effect of additional children on the price of time of mothers with
elementary education dissipates as soon as the children reach the age of 3
years. Thus, while a child less than 3 years old increases the value of his
mother's time by 10 percent, children beyond that age do not have any
consistent effect onThe effect of a child younger than 3 years on a
mother's value of time when she has high school education is somewhat
(though not significantly) higher than the effect in the case of a mother
with elementary education (12 percent), but then the decline in this
effect is much more gradual, so that even children over 11 years old exert
a positive effect on their mother's value of time. Young children have the
largest effect on their mother's evaluation of her time when she has a
college education (an increase of over 20 percent), but this effect diminishes
to the same rate as high school mothers as the child grows older, with 00
childrenover 11 years of age having no effect on (or perhaps even re-
ducing) the value of their mother's time.
To verify these impressions I ran separate regressions in each education

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF TIME 481
sions, and table 5, where Wisincluded. The three separate regressions
suggest thatis increasing with education, implying that the variation in
the price of time and/or the asking wage varies with education (and
income). Similarly, the income effect becomes more pronounced the higher
the woman's level of education is. Since education and income are posi-
tively correlated, this may indicate that the elasticity of the price of time
with respect to income (0.03, 0.07, and 0.17, respectively) increases with
income. There exist only slight differences among the three groups in the
effect of the woman's age and her husband's age and education on but,
as was observed earlier, there are considerable differences with respect to
the child effect.
The importance of the effect of an additional child on the mother's value
of time declines significantly with the child's age in all three education
groups. However, the extent of this decline varies widely among the three
groups. A child under age 3 increases the value of his mother's time by
5percentif she has only elementary education, by 11 percent if she
possesses high school education, and by almost 30 percent if she is a
college graduate. On the other hand, a child older than 11 years decreases
ifthe mother has elementary or college education (by 3 and 6 percent,
respectively) but increases itif the mother is a high school graduate
(neither of the first two results is statistically significant).
Further evidence on the child effect can be found in the patterns of
annual labor-force participation. Thus, I recomputed the interaction equa-
tion, replacing the previous dependent variable by a dummy variable
reflecting annual participation. The evidence presented in table 6 supports
our previous findings concerning the effect the husband's and wife's age
and education, their family income, and the child's age have on the
housewife's value of time. These findings, however, blur somewhat the
observed interaction between the child's age and the mother's education.
It is still evident, however, that a child affects his mother's price of time
if she is an elementary school graduate only when he is very young. How-
ever, the prior observed difference between high school and college grad-
uates in the effect of a young child on his mother's value of time almost
disappears. The decline in the child effect as he grows older where the
mother is a college graduate is a little less sharp, and the decline of this
effect where the mother is a high school graduate is even more gradual.2°
Given the shaky nature of our findings about the interaction between
the child's age and his mother's education, one could have dismissed them
as a flicker of chance—an offspring of sampling variability. Still, itis
28 Of particular interest is the strong negative effect husband's education has on L
whenthe husband has attended only elementary school while his wife is a college
graduate. This may suggest a reversal of roles in the household consistent with the
principle of comparative advantage.
29 Replacing the probit method by the tobit method and estimating the equations







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aHOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF TIME 483
tempting to rationalize these patterns even at the risk that these patterns
do not exist.
It was argued earlier that an increase in education increases the pro-
ductivity of the woman in the household sector. This increase in produc-
tivity favors the production of child services if the technological improve-
ment is "child-services biased" or if it is biased in favor of inputs which
constitute a large fraction of child services' costs of production, such as
the mother's time. Under these circumstances, other things being equal,
the consumption of child services tends to increase with the wife's educa-
tion. In particular, we should expect that given the number of children, the
quality of the child is positively correlated with the mother's education
(the amount of child services represented by each child increases with the
mother's education). The increased demand for child services is reflected
in an increased demand for the mother's time when the child is young for
one or more of the following reasons:
a) The mother's productivity differential changes with the age of the
child. There may be only very small differences in productivity between
high school and college graduates when the child is young, but these differ-
ences widen as the child grows older and the production of quality calls
for ever increasing inputs of human capital services. An increase in the
demand for child services leads, therefore, to an increase in the demand
for the mother's time when the child is young; but the increase in the
demand for time becomes less and less pronounced as the differences in
productivity increase.
b) There is a low elasticity of substitution between the mother's time
and other inputs when the child is young. The production function of
child services may call for some invariant amounts of the mother's time
that are proportional to output, the mother having to establish herself as
the prime figure in the baby's life in order to be an efficient producer of
quality in the future.
c)Babycare may involve a large positive psychic income component
when the baby is one's own, and considerable negative psychic income
when the baby belongs to someone else. Thus, a college graduate may find
it cheaper to care for her baby herself, rather than enter the labor force
and hire a high school graduate to fill in her post. This psychic income
component may change with the child's age, giving rise to a different
reaction as the child grows older.
d) Finally, it can be argued that the production function of child
services varies with education, because of imperfect information. This
argument has been applied in the analysis of the effect of education on the
quantity of children (Michael 1970), but it may equally hold true in the
case of quality, college-educated mothers being more aware of the im-
portance of infancy to the future development of the child.
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N0TE.—Terms in parentheses are insignificant at a = .05.
for the mother's time increases uniformly with the number of children in
a given age group.3° To test this assumption, a set of 16 dummy variables
was defined, specifying whether the women had zero, one, two, or three or
more children younger than 6 years old and whether she had zero, one,
two, or three or more children in the age group 6—11. The estimated effects
of income, age, education, and husband's characteristics are almost identi-
cal with those presented in table 2 and thus are not reproduced here.
Estimated effects of the new children variables on the weekly rate of parti-
cipation are presented in table 7. These findings demonstrate once again
the effect of the child's age on his mother's value of time, but contain very
little evidence to refute our prior hypothesis. Similarly, an attempt to test
the validity of the assumption within the various education groups, using
a somewhat different definition of the children variable, did not come up
with any persuasive evidence that will call for a reformulation of the
30 I would hesitate to interpret any change in the time input per child associated
with a change in the number of children within a given age group as evidence for
returns to scale in the production of child services. Even if one adheres to the tradi-
tional assumption that, other things such as parents' income, education, and age being
equal, an increase in the number of children does not result in a declinein the
optimal quality of the child, quality being exogeneously determined, it is dangerous to
claim that an observed decline in inputs per child in families with a larger number of
children attests to increasing returns to scale. Other things being equal, the difference
in the number of children may be explained in terms of differences in efficiency in
the production of child services. Under these circumstances the observed decline in
inputs per child is a spurious result.
5).0. ::
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TABLE 8
EFFECT OF CHilDREN ON THEIR MOTHER'S VALVE OF TIME:
MOTHER'S EDUCATION = HIGH ScHooL
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NoTE—Terms in parentheses are insignificant at a —.05.
estimation procedure (the estimates of the regression for mothers with a
high schooi education are presented in table 8)
LV.Some Concluding Remarks
Given our tentative conclusions, it is of interest to compare them with the
indirect evidence contained in other studies of the labor-force participation
behavior of married women. Leibowitz (1972) used the same body of data
I did (the 1960 Census 1/1,000 sample) but focused only on the number
of weeks worked. Not surprisingly, there is a great similarity between her
results and the results reported in table 6. Leibowitz reports that children
under 3 years old seem to be an equally forceful deterrent to the market-
labor supply of women of all three education classes (elementary, high
school, and college), that the labor supply of high school and college
graduates is more sensitive to the existence of children older than 3 years
than is that of elementary school graduates, and that there exists no signifi-
cant difference between high school and college graduates in this regard.
Smith (1972b) using the Survey of Economic Opportunity data, reports
31 Table 8 does not include the estimated effects of income, age, and the husband's
characteristics, since they are almost identical with those produced in table 5. I do not
present the results for the other education groups because most of the "children"
coefficients are insignificant.
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HOUSEWIFE'S VALUE OF TIME 487
thathe could find little to support the notion that the effect of children
on time inputs at home varies with education (it is, however, worth noting
that Smith investigated the difference among husband's education classes).
Hill and Stafford used in their study the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center's 1965 Productive American survey (Morgan, Sirageldin,
Baerwaldt 1966). These data allowed them to investigate not only the
effect of children on the hours mothers worked in the market but also the
effect of children on time spent on "housework." They observe that while
the effect of children on mother's market time is usually insignificant,
children have a significant effect on the amount of "housework." This
effect varies with socioeconomic status groups. While for the lowest socio-
economic group only children under 3 years old have any effect on their
mother's "housework," older children also have an effect when the mother
belongs to the higher status groups. It seems that the effect of a young
child on time spent in "housework" is greater when the mother belongs to
the highest status group than when she belongs to the second highest, but
that these differences tend to diminish as the child grows older(it is
difficult to tell whether this result is significant).
The record does little to confirm, but also does not directly contradict,
the findings reported in the last section. There is no way to strengthen the
claim that the effect of a child depends on the mother's education but by
further research. A sample excluding families who do not have children
less than 12 years old, and data, such as those from the Ohio Survey, con-
taining a better measure of labor-force experience should help in sharpening
the conclusions.
In summary, it seems that this paper poses more new questions than
the old ones it answers. What, for instance, is the production function of
child services and how does it change with the age of the child? What are
the elasticities of substitutions in production between time and goods and
how are they affected by the child's age? How does this productivity vary
with the child's age?
Economists tend to regard children as a consumption (or production)
durable, but in economic literature the tendency has been to analyze the
demand for child services as demand for nondurables. I hope this paper
may help in reversing this trend.
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Appendix







No. in sample 975 237 566 172
Percentage distribution 100.0 24.3 58.1 17.6
Wife's age distribution (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
<30 22.3 7.2 28.6 22.1
30—49 49.8 37,5 53.9 53.5
50+ 27.9 55.3 17.5 24.4
Husband's average age 45.1 54.8 41.8 42.6
Husband's education distribution (%)' ....100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Elementary school 32.4 75.9 21.9 7.0
High school 44.6 22.4 58.5 29.6
College 23.0 1.7 19.6 63.4
Average no. of children:
<18 1.29 0.81 1.47 1.34
<3 0.25 0.11 0.28 0.32
3—5 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.27
6—11 0.46 0.30 0.50 0.49
12—17 0.34 0.30 0.39 0.26
Families with child (%):
<18 46.9 24.1 55.1 51.2
<3 19.4 8.4 41.1 25.6
3—5 19.7 8.9 23.9 20.9
6—11 31.1 19.4 35.3 33.1
Average income* 6,774 5,667 6,756 8,356
Average potential wage:
Arithmetic mean 1.998 1.836 1.868 2.653
Geometric mean 1.551 1.363 1.508 2.032
Participation rate (%) 31.6 23.2 32.7 39.5
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81 1 47 1 34 Most of the papers in this volume consider the value of time as one of
111 0128 0.32 the determinants of the size of the family, but Reuben Gronau takes the
.10 opposite view in his paper. In part, this reflects different notions of the
3o 0.39 0,26 value of time. In the economic theory of fertility, the value of time is a
predetermined parameter of the family's intertemporal budget constraint,
a measure of the consumption foregone by having a child. In Gronau's
8.9 23.9 20.9 terminology, the value of time is at least partly a measure of the location
9.4 35.3 33.1 on the budget constraint chosen by the family and is therefore a measure
667 6,756 8,356 of preferences of the family. It is important to keep this terminological
836 1.868 2.653 distinction in mind in comparing his paper with the others.
163 1.508 2.032 An important feature of Gronau's paper isits explicit treatment of
3.2 32.7 395 variations in preferences among the population. Although the other authors
generally admit the existence of a diversity of preferences with regard to
childbearing and working in the market, they develop the theory and
empirical applications as ifall families had the same preferences. The
effects of variations in preferences appear only in the random disturbance
which is added to the model almost as an afterthought. Gronau treats
variations of tastes (in the form of variations in the value of time) as an
integral part of his model from the start. He assumes that the value of
time, ii, has a normal distribution whose mean depends on certain observed
characteristics including the number of children in the family. He then
estimates the parameters of this dependence by the statistical method of
maximum likelihood, using data on participation in the labor force. The
results are clearly suitable for predicting whether a woman is in the labor
force given her characteristics, especially the number and ages of her
children. A question which deserves more attention is whether the esti-
mated equation can be given a structural interpretation. For example,
could the equation be used to predict the effect on labor-force participation
of a subsidy for childbearing? Gronau's introductory remarks seem to
489490 ROBERT E. HALL
suggest that his results might answer this question, but I think considera-
ble caution is necessary.
In my view, a better way to account for variations in preferences would
recognize that the size of the family and the labor-force participation of
the wife are jointly determined. Suppose, for example, that there is a single
axis along which tastes vary. One end of the axis is traditional, valuing
large families and domestic activities, and the other is modern, valuing
activities outside the home for both wife and husband. Suppose, further,
that all families face the same prices and wages. Even then we will find a
strong negative relation between family size and labor-force participation
of the wife. Since no part of this relation is caused by variations in prices,
we cannot give a structural interpretation to the results at all.
Now, in fact, not all of the variation in Gronau's sample is caused by
variations in preferences along a single axis. To the extent that other
sources of variation in the number of children are independent of the
sources of variation in the decision to enter the labor force, the estimates
will be closer to the underlying structural relation. As Gronau pointed out
in the discussion, purely random variations in family size reduce the bias
in his results. Unfortunately, we do not know how much bias remains.
Gronau has made an important contribution in this and a related paper
by developing a method for estimating the true mean of the wage distribu-
tion facing a group of potential workers. The naïve estimate obtained by
taking the average of the wages of those who work has a serious upward
bias for any group with a rate of labor-force participation much less than
one. The exclusion of nonparticipants generally eliminates observations of
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